Temporal case study of household behavioural response to Cape Town's Day Zero using smart meter data by Booysen, M. J. et al.
Temporal case study of household behavioural response to Cape Town’s
“Day Zero” using smart meter data
M.J. Booysena,∗, M. Visserb, R. Burgerc
aDepartment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
bSchool of Economics, University of Cape Town, South Africa
cDepartment of Economics, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
Abstract
Faced with the threat of “Day Zero”, when it was feared that Cape Town’s taps could run dry, consumers
reduced household water usage from 540 to 280 litres per household per day over the 36 months between
January 2015 and January 2018. This paper describes the events that prompted this reduction. We look
at how changes in water use were affected by official announcements and by public engagement with this
news via the social media activity and internet searches. We analysed the water usage of a subset of middle
to high income households where smart hot and cold water meters were installed. For hot water usage
patterns we compared meter readings with that in another area unaffected by the drought. We further map
our cold water smart meter readings against that of the City of Cape Town’s municipal data for domestic
freestanding households — a sample of more than 400,000 households. We found that the introduction of
Level 5 restrictions had a perverse effect on consumption, possibly due to confusing messages. The most
dramatic change in behaviour appears to have been instigated by a media storm and consequent user panic
after the release of the City’s Critical Water Shortages Disaster Plan in October 2017. However, contradictory
communication from national and provincial government eroded some of this gain. The paper concludes with
recommendations for demand management in a similar future scenario.
Keywords: Drought response; demand side management; user behaviour; household water usage;
time-of-day analysis; smart water meters; Cape Town drought
Word count: 4661 words.
1. Introduction
In 2017, experiencing one of the Western Cape’s worst droughts since 1904, Cape Town became notorious
in the international media as a major world city about to run out of municipal water. The prospect of dry
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taps was dramatically named “Day Zero” by the City Council. From November 2016 to Feb 2018, the City
of Cape Town incrementally imposed six levels of water restrictions, from Level 3 to Level 6B, in an attempt
to curb usage.
There are only four previous studies that examine user water saving responses to the Cape Town drought.
Visser and Bru¨hl (2018) and Ko¨hlin et al. (2018) note that household usage in Cape Town, especially by
aﬄuent users, declined sharply over the three year period from January 2015 to January 2018, from 540
to 280 litres per household per day, as the drought intensified. Brick et al. (2018) show that “behavioural
nudges” sent to domestic households in the early stages of the drought, between November 2015 and May
2016, had a modest effect, reducing water usage by 0.6 % to 1.3 %, and Brick and Visser (2018) note that a
subsequent campaign of warning letters in March 2017, targeting households using more than 50 kL/month
was effective in reducing usage by 3%.
The topic of drought and water usage behaviour is well covered in the international literature. Un-
derstanding water users’ behaviour at a time of water shortage is vital for managing demand and supply
effectively (Teo et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2018). Analysis of the interaction between drought-related mes-
sages from the various spheres of government and the media and the citizens’ behavioural responses could
provide valuable information for improving management and communication during a crisis of this kind and
achieving the desired result, in any water-scarce city like Cape Town (Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Polebitski
and Palmer, 2010; Makwiza et al., 2017; Anderson and Nagarajan, 2016; Quesnel and Ajami, 2017). The
possibility of climate change increasing the likelihood of prolonged droughts, such as those recently experi-
enced in cities in Queensland, Sa˜u Paulo and cities in California, makes this particularly pertinent (Grant
et al., 2013; Amir et al., 2014; Diffenbaugh et al., 2015; Teo et al., 2015; Soriano et al., 2016).
Measuring user participation in water-conscious usage during droughts, Dascher et al. (2014) found that,
to drive demand-side management of water resources, better results would be achieved by water usage
restrictions and educational campaigns than by incentives to use water conservation technologies. Using
internet search terms and monthly smart meter data to evaluate user responses to media articles in severe
weather conditions in California, Quesnel and Ajami (2017) found a strong correlation between media coverage
of severe weather (drought) and reduced monthly usage.
Rein et al. (2013) found that analysing water usage patterns through billing information is problematic
because the usual monthly reading of meters hides many of the transient effects that may only last a day or a
week. They noted that achieving water usage targets through demand side management is challenging, since
the user has to access the water meter manually and make frequent readings and interpret them meaningfully.
High frequency sampling is required to discern users’ reactions to the barrage of municipal notices and
media messages during a water crisis. Smart metering provides a useful means of obtaining data and has been
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used in a number of studies (Willis et al., 2011; Gurung et al., 2015, 2017; Beal and Flynn, 2015; Cominola
et al., 2015; Britton et al., 2013). For example, Gurung et al. (2015) demonstrated how smart water meters
can be used to analyse behavioural changes, and how smart meter data analysis can be used to disaggregate
usage types.
This study adds to the literature on household behavioural responses during droughts by examining
the temporal detail of household water saving behaviour in response to official announcements on water
restrictions and public engagement with this information via social media activity and internet searches – in
the shadow of the realistic threat that taps could run dry if households failed to respond adequately.
Our analysis of household responses to official announcements is guided by Rogers (1975)’s theory of
protection motivation. According to Rogers’ theory, the household’s response is determined by their appraisal
of the threat as well as their appraisal of their own ability to respond to the threat. In line with this theory,
Witte and Allen (2000)’s meta-analysis found that fear appeals had the greatest impact on behaviour change
when they made the public aware of their vulnerability but also made it clear what the public needed to do
to help alleviate the problem.
We start by showing trends in hot and cold water use in Cape Town in the eight months leading up to
March 2018, when taps were predicted to run dry. The cold water is the total household’s water used, and
therefore includes water that would eventually be heated. We compared hot water usage in Cape Town to that
of two other regions in South Africa, Mpumalanga and Gauteng, that were unaffected by drought but exposed
to many of the same drivers of change as Cape Town. These hot water measurements provided a control
against which to assess behavioural changes in Cape Town. To cross-check the external validity of our sample
of users, we also compare our sample of cold water smart meter data trends with the median monthly metered
household water usage for the City of Cape Town (a sample of more than 400,000 domestic free standing
households). We tested observed changes in cold water usage behaviour for our smart metered households
against an interrupted time series analysis of key events and government announcements. Motivated by
Roger’s theory model, we used social media analytics to identify points of heightened public engagement
with this threat, to understand how the public digested, assessed and navigated the barrage of notices and
news that emerged during the crisis. The social analytics simultaneously captured the household assessment
of the credibility and severity of their vulnerability (threat appraisal) and household’s efforts to find useful
ways to respond to the threat and positively affect change (appraisal of their ability to respond to the threat).
2. Data and methods
Before the worst of the drought in the Western Cape, two water management devices had been installed as
a pilot project in a small number of households in South Africa: a smart hot water meter called “Geasy” and
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a smart cold water meter called “Dropula” (Roux and Booysen, 2017; Ripunda and Booysen, 2018). These
meters take and report measurements remotely with a per-minute time resolution and 0.5 L volume resolution.
The hot water Geasies were installed at volunteering households as part of a funded research project in the
Mpumalanga and Gauteng provinces, in the north of South Africa, and in the Western Cape province, in the
south, from June 2015 to December 2016. This enabled us to compare the hot water usage of the control
group in the north and the drought-affected group in the south. The cold water Dropulas were installed in the
Cape Town area from October 2016 to August 2017, either at the households of water-conscious volunteers
who tested the technology or users who had the devices installed to manage their water usage. Our sample
consisted of 33 households with hot water meters (Geasies) in the Cape Town area, 54 households with hot
water meters (Geasies) in the north, and 16 households with cold water meters (Dropulas) in the Western
Cape.
As both Geasy and Dropula households are predominantly from the highest income quintile in a South
African context, and since there households self-selected to use the devices, the sample is certainly biased
- these users can be assumed to be more educated, conscientious and responsive to conservation messaging
than the general populace. For this reason we cross-check our findings by mapping our data against that of
the City of Cape Town’s domestic users’ aggregate water consumption, as well as those in the highest income
quintile amongst the City’s users. It should be noted that this top income quintile, are also the highest water
users, and therefore likely to have the biggest effect on overall water usage (Harlan et al., 2009; Brick et al.,
2018; Brick and Visser, 2018). We do not claim that our small sample is representative of South Africa as a
whole; it was, however, encouraging to find that the trends we observed in our sample were broadly aligned
with the City of Cape Town median trends.
To supplement and interpret the quantitative analysis of water usage by various samples, we analysed
mainstream media and social media reactions to the government announcements. We used two tools: a
social media analysis tool, Talkwalker, and an internet search term analysis tool, Google Trends. Google
Trends scales searches on a relative 0.0 to 1.0 scale, where 1.0 is the highest search rate for that term(s)
for the entire period, while the Talkwalker results were normalised to report the same metric. We searched
terms of two types: firstly those related to the water restriction levels and secondly those that we have called
“ariditaphobic”, i.e. terms related to fear of the drought and its consequences, especially those used in the
disaster plan Critical Water Shortages Disaster Plan of 4 October 2017. The terms in the first list were Level
5 or Level 5 restrictions or Level 5 water restrictions or water restrictions. The terms in the second were
collection points, disaster, crisis, South African National Defence Force or SANDF, bottled water, borehole.
We limited the Google Trends search to the Western Cape and the social media search to South Africa, using
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and Google+. We restricted our searches to August 2017 to October 2017,
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because our data suggested there had been a strong and consistent decrease in water use by our sample of
households over those three months.
To test our hypothesis that users’ water-use reactions were influenced more strongly by the alarmism in the
mainstream media and social media than by the official announcements of restrictions, we used an interrupted
time series analysis using daily water use data. This method uses a segmented regression to test whether
an event caused a rupture in a level or trend of an outcome, or both. Because we found a high correlation
between the outcome variables in sequential time-periods (first-order autocorrelation), we used a generalised
least-squares approach. Closely following the notation of Linden (2010) the standard ITSA regression model
for a single event and treatment period has the following form: Yt = β0 + β1Tt + β2Xt + β3XtTt + et, where
Yt is water use per day in litres, Tt is the time since the start of the study, Xt is a dummy (indicator) variable
representing the event, XtTt is an interaction term and et is the error term. β0 represents the intercept,
1 is the slope prior to the event, while 2 represents the change in daily water consumption after the event
and 3 represents the difference in the slopes for water use before and after the event. For consistency and
comparability we excluded weekends. We tested for changes in both the level (volume per day) and the trend
at three points in time: 3 September 2017, when Level 5 restrictions were announced, 11 October 2017, when
drought panic terms spiked in the mainstream media and social media, and on 31 January 2018 when the
restrictions were increased to Level 6B. We also tested 4 October 2017, when the Critical Water Shortages
Disaster Plan was announced CoCT (2017b).
3. The municipality’s step-by-step management of Cape Town’s water crisis
This section provides a chronology of the City’s official announcements, which is also shown in Figure
1. The drought-stricken Western Cape was declared a disaster area on 22 May 2017 (WCG, 2017). Since
November 2016, Cape Town had been on Level 3 water restrictions, which prohibited the use of garden
hoses, sprinkler irrigation and washing of cars. On 1 June 2017 the City implemented Level 4 restrictions,
which limited each user to 100 L/person/d and banned all non-essential outdoor water use, including filling of
swimming pools (CoCT, 2017d). A month later, on 1 July, Level 4B restrictions were implemented, reducing
daily usage to 87 L/person/d and giving households a 10.5 kL/month allocation, based on the per-person
usage of a household of four over 30 days (CoCT, 2017a) . Our measurements and the time sequence for our
analysis begin after this.
On 17 August, the City’s mayor announced the City’s Water Resilience Plan, which included plans on
water augmentation programmes, punitive measures and fines for heavy users, installation of water restriction
devices at non-complying properties at the householder’s expense, and a looming additional restriction from
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Figure 1: A timeline of the events relating to the management of Cape Town’s water crisis.
September (CoCT, 2017a). On 3 September, the City implemented Level 5 restrictions, which included more
fines, and announced that water pressure management would begin, to reduce the losses through leaks.
It was noticeable that Level 5, when finally implemented, contained two apparently conflicting restrictions:
use per person was still limited to 87 L/d (implying 10.5 kL/month for a four-person household), as in Level
4B, but residential properties were capped at capped at 20 kL/month. The City may have intended this
more lenient cap on household usage to accommodate low-income properties with larger household sizes or
several dwellings per property, but it did not communicate this formally to the public, and the press release
associated with this 20 kL/month cap (CoCT, 2017c; News24, 2017b; Cape Talk, 2017b), did not say the
limit applied to residences of “eight occupants or more”, as was mentioned in one subsequent radio interview
(Cape Talk, 2017a). The 20 kL/month limit thus conveyed a mixed and somewhat perverse message to most
average-sized households already using below 10.5 kL/month
On 4 October 2017, the City’s mayor released its Critical Water Shortages Disaster Plan. Table 1 shows
the most striking points of the plan.
On 25 October 2017, after the negative press and the panic that followed the issuing of the disaster plan,
the Premier of the Western Cape and the national Minister of Water and Sanitation, in an apparent attempt
to calm the situation, issued separate statements to reassure residents that Cape Town would probably not
run out of water (Cape Talk, 2017c; Eyewitness News (EWN), 2017).
On 1 January 2018, the City implemented Level 6 water restrictions, which maintained the limit of
87 L/person/d, but crucially, clearly re-stated the monthly household limit of 10.5 kL/month. The City also
started to actually impose fines on households exceeding this cap.
On the 1 February 2018, the City implemented Level 6B water restrictions, now with a limit of 50 L/person/d,
and a household cap of 6 kL/month. The City also suggested limits per usage type, such as 18 L for washing
clothes and 15 L for showering. It also announced that 200 water collection points had been identified for
when the City ran out of water, for a city with a population of 4.2 million (WCG, Treasury, 2017).
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Table 1: Excerpt from the Critical Water Shortages Disaster Plan, released 4 October 2017 (De Lille, 2017)
.
Relevance Description
General Winter, the rainy season, was over and users were in for a long, hot, dry
summer period.
27 % usable water was left in the dams
Cape Town was expected to run out of water by March 2018.
The national Minister of Water and Sanitation [importantly, from the African
National Congress (ANC), the opposition to the governing Democratic Al-
liance (DA) in the in the Western Cape] had been engaged to discuss water
security and new emergency schemes.
Phase 1 This phase was immediately active
Water rationing through extreme pressure reduction would be introduced,
which would lead to intermittent, localised temporary water supply disrup-
tions.
Users were advised to store up to five litres of municipal drinking water only
for essential usage.
Phase 2 The whole system would be disrupted with a limited number of supply points.
Water collection points would be put up.
The defence force (SANDF) and the police service (SAPS) would be deployed
to ensure that general safety was maintained throughout the city.
Critical services, and areas with an increased risk of disease and fires, would
continue to receive drinking water.
Phase 3 The existing system would collapse
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Figure 2: Household hot water use in Cape Town based on weekly medians expressed as average use per day, from Geasy smart
controllers, compared with control areas (in Mpumalanga and Gauteng) unaffected by the drought. Usage for the control areas
is normalised to the first month of Cape Town’s. The orange line is the difference between the two regions, while the grey and
light red lines contain the absolute usage values.
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Figure 3: Household cold water used in Cape Town (including water that would eventually be heated) based on weekly medians
expressed as average use per day, from Dropula smart water meters, and monthly Cape Town household medians.
4. Descriptive analysis
4.1. Observed trends in water use, August 2017 to March 2018
4.1.1. Hot water
Figure 2 shows hot water usage by the drought-affected Western Cape sample and by the sample from
regions of the country that were not affected by the drought. The sampling points represent the weekly
aggregated data, expressed as the daily average usage, for each preceding week captured by the Geasy smart
controllers. The profiles show how the difference between the Western Cape and the control region usage
(the orange line) dropped from the middle of August 2017, after the release of the Water Resilience Plan.
The difference is stark and continues to increase to a peak difference of −9 L/d after the second week of
September. A week after the Level 5 restrictions were introduced, the Cape Town usage perversely increases,
and the difference between the two samples quickly reduces to 2 L/d in the following four weeks, apparently
indicating diminished savings subsequent to Level 5 implementation.
A week after the announcement of the disaster plan on 4 October 2017, the difference between the regions
starts to increase, reaching −21 L/d in the first week of November, indicating a substantial reduction in
the Cape Town sample’s usage. In mid-November, after the intervention by the premier and the national
minister, the difference between the groups plateaus and then decreases to −6 L/d at the start of the holiday
period (18 December 2017 to 7 January 2018).
After the holiday period, which overlaps with the implementation of Level 6 restrictions, the difference
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between the groups increases steadily, reaching −33 L/d in the last week of January 2018, as the Cape Town
sample reduce their usage in response to the looming crisis and the introduction of Level 6B restrictions.
After the peak in the difference between the groups, it plateaus until such time that Day Zero was postponed
to July, from where the difference between the groups sharply reduces again as the Cape Town sample’s usage
steadily increases.
4.1.2. Cold water
Figure 2 shows the cold water usage by the Dropula smart water meter sample and by City of Cape
Town households. A weekly aggregate was taken of the medians of the smart water meter data, which are
captured every minute. The City of Cape Town data are the monthly medians of all households in the city.
The Dropula sample’s cold water usage profile bears a general resemblance to the City of Cape Town’s,
but, as expected, the former use significantly less than the latter, probably because of the self-selection effect
of water-conscious users who opted to install the smart meter. Also, the sample’s profile suggests that they
reacted earlier than the City of Cape Town users, as a study by Anderson et al. (2018) leads us to expect.
The more frequent sampling rate (aggregated to weekly) of the smart water meter data makes it possible to
see the short transient effects that may be hidden in the monthly City of Cape Town readings. For example,
we can see a plunge in the Dropula profile from the first week of October 2017, after the announcement of the
disaster plan, and a rise in the last week of October, after the messages from the premier and the national
minister.
The cold water profile shows an initial increasing trend in the second week of August 2017, as temperatures
rose and users started irrigating their gardens and filling their swimming pools, reflecting the trend observed
from 2014 to 2016 in the City of Cape Town household data, and reported by Visser and Bru¨hl (2018) and
Ko¨hlin et al. (2018).
Three noteworthy events occurred in the first two weeks of August that might explain the apparent
levelling of and subsequent reduction in the last half of August: the national government derided the city
for not reacting adequately to the drought crisis, the City threatened to install water restriction devices for
heavy users, and the mainstay annual West Coast Flower Show was cancelled because of the drought (IOL,
2017c,a,b). Crucially, however, on 17 August the City publicly announced the Water Resilience Plan.
Although behaviour was affected at this point, an increase in usage can be seen after the first week of
September 2017, which is when the Level 5 restrictions were implemented. At this point the smart meter
users were at 250 L/d, which equates to 7.5 kL/month (The Cape Town median was at 300 L/d per over the
month). The perverse effect of the contradiction in the Level 5 restrictions (described above) may explain the
increase in usage to over 350 L/d (or 10.5 kL/month) at the end of the September school break (30 September
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to 8 October, shaded in the graph). We might expect higher usage during this break, as more people would
be at home, but the higher usage is maintained into the first week of October, following the profile of previous
years.
A reduction can be seen in the second and third week of October, after the city announced the disaster
plan on 4 October 2017. Following the release of the plan, an outpouring of alarmist and distrustful arti-
cles appeared in the media, voicing threats of dams less than a third full at the end of the rainy season,
disease and death, and accusing the City of mismanagement and bad planning and non-viable augmentation
schemes (Head, 2017; The South African; Davis; Cape Business News; Deklerk and Collins, 2017; Koopman
and de Buys, 2017; News24, 2017c). A team of experts from the Climate System Analysis Group, the South
African Environmental Observation Network and the Departments of Environmental and Geographical Sci-
ence and the Built Environment at the University of Cape Town in unison stated publicly on 11 October
that the City’s aquifer extraction plan was impossible (News24, 2017a) 1.
The graph shows the sudden effect on the user profile, with usage plummeting for the three weeks following
the media surge, as Quesnel and Ajami (2017) predicted. But after the calming statements by the premier
and the national minister on 25 October 2017, usage plateaus with a slight increasing trend and does not
decrease again until the second week of December, overlapping with a small increase in social media activity
seen in Figure 4.
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the holiday period’s usage (18 December 2017 to 7 January 2018,
and possibly the immediately preceding and following weeks too), since many people, particularly the mostly
aﬄuent smart water meter users, may not have been at home. However, after the second week in January
usage increases steadily to levels higher than before the holiday period, matching an increase in the City
of Cape Town household data. This increase peaks shortly after the City’s announcement of Level 6B
restrictions. A further reduction follows the implementation of Level 6B on 1 February, after which usage
plateaus and slightly increases with the announcement on 22 February that Day Zero had been postponed
to July.
4.2. Internet searches and social media activity
In this section we examine the public engagement with government announcements by analysing spikes
in internet searches and social media activity. Based on Rogers’ theory of protection motivation (1975), we
consider threat appraisal and the appraisal of the household’s ability to respond to be crucial mediating
factors for behavioural change. Our hypothesis was that internet searches and social media activity are
1The Mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille, was placed on leave on the eve of the release of the disaster plan, facing
accusations of misappropriation of funds. This probably further damaged people’s trust in the City of Cape Town at that point.
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Figure 4: Results from social media search and Google Trends search showing the prevalence of water restrictions terms and
ariditaphobic (fear of drought) terms. (a) Search terms and (b) social terms for period around October 2017. (c) Social terms
for the period August 2017 to March 2018.
important and easily observable conduits for the household’s efforts to appraise both their own vulnerability
and also their ability to positively contribute to reducing this risk.
We expected that in some cases the media’s interpretation and discussion of an announcement might
represent an event in itself, giving the announcement added force by imagining its implications, rightly or
wrongly.
Figure 4 (a) and (b) shows that during the week preceding the drop in usage there was an increase in
ariditaphobic terms and a decrease in terms relating to the Level 5 restrictions. Spikes in the frequency of
terms related to drought panic, however, do not overlap with the announcement of Level 5 on 3 September
but occur much later, towards early October. These spikes in search terms and social media activity give
11
Table 2: Interrupted time series analysis (Prais-Winsten first order autocorrelation regression) of the events in question, with
evaluation using the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Nr of obs 174 F(7,166) 8.01
Prob > F 0.00 Root MSE 44.78
R2 0.25 Adjusted R2 0.22
Water Coef. Std.errors t P > |t| 95% CI
Trend 0.4 2.0 0.2 0.8 -3.5 4.4
3 Sept -49.2 37.0 -1.3 0.2 -122.3 23.9
3 Sept trend 3.7 2.8 1.3 0.2 -1.9 9.2
11 Oct 17 -99.6 31.9 -3.1 0.0 -162.6 -36.6
11 Oct trend -5.0 1.8 -2.8 0.0 -8.6 -1.4
31 Jan 15.3 27.3 0.6 0.6 -38.5 69.3
31 Jan trend 0.9 1.00 0.9 0.4 -1.0 2.9
Usage 222.9 30.6 7.3 0.0 162.5 283.2
rho 0.444
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 1.12
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.04
the impression that the announcement of tighter water restrictions may have had less effect on the social
mindset than the media frenzy and scaremongering that ensued after the release of the Critical Water Shortage
Disaster Plan, which referred to the risk of running out of water, the possibility of having to queue for a ration
of drinking water at collection points, and the increased threat of fire and disease in crowded settlements.
We tested this hypothesis with the interrupted time series analysis using daily water usage data, as
explained in the methods section above. Table 2 shows evidence of a large and significant rupture in the level
and trend of water use at 11 October 2017, but not on 3 September 2017 (Level 5 restrictions implemented)
or 31 January 2018 (Level 6B restrictions implemented). The 11 October water use levels declined by 100 L/d
and the trend in water use decreased by 5 L/d after that date. We found no significant change on 4 October
(test not shown in Table 2, but for 4 October 2017 P > |T | = 0.495 ) when the disaster plan was introduced.
However, the strong correlation found on 11 October was persistent until 17 October, matching exactly the
pattern observed in the social media and internet search analysis before weekly aggregation.
Figure 4 (c) illustrates the scale of the panic that coincided with the announcement of Level 6B and
imminent threat of Day Zero, which is followed by the apparent further reduction in usage.
5. Conclusion
This paper describes the sequence of events leading up to Cape Town’s purported “Day Zero” in 2017 and
2018, and connects key events to the changes in behaviour of a small sample of users with smart meters that
measure cold and hot water respectively. Social media and search term analyses in combination with a time
series analysis show that the biggest response was observed, not when the restrictions or tariff increases were
imposed, but in response to a three-phased disaster plan that warned of disastrous outcomes. The results
suggest that users responded more strongly to the threat of waterless taps than to the implemented levels of
water restrictions.
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Our smart meter data in combination with billing data from the City points to a remarkable success on
the side of citizens to drastically revise their consumption patterns over a relatively short period of time.
Moreover our research seems to indicate that while inciting some level of fear-mongering may have been a
risky strategy for the municipality to undertake, it may have been the single most successful intervention in
effecting profound behavioural change amongst citizens.
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